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Nationalist Internationalism in the Modern Age 
 
David Motadel 
 
On the morning of 24 June 2016, the day after the UK EU referendum, right-
wing nationalists across Europe (and beyond) were united in their jubilation, 
hailing the result as a victory of the supremacy of the nation over a crumbling 
liberal order. From the Front National’s party headquarters outside Paris, a 
triumphant Marine Le Pen announced the beginning of a ‘patriotic’ 
international ‘movement’ that ‘can’t be stopped’. In the Netherlands, far-right 
leader Geert Wilders celebrated the referendum’s ‘huge consequences’, 
declaring that the people needed ‘a national identity’, ‘to rally around a flag’. In 
Germany, Frauke Petry proclaimed that the time was ripe to ‘mobilise’ all 
nationalist forces ‘across all borders’ to forge a ‘Europe of fatherlands’. Her 
deputy, Beatrix von Storch, said she had ‘wept for joy’. The transnational 
chorus of nationalists also included Hungary’s Victor Orban, Italy’s Matteo 
Salvini, Denmark’s Kristian Thulesen Dahl, Austria’s Heinz-Christian Strache 
and many others. From a golf course in Scotland, presidential candidate 
Donald Trump hailed the vote as a ‘great thing’, seeing a ‘big parallel’ to the 
mood in the United States where people also wanted to ‘take their borders 
back’. Demonstrating a remarkable degree of solidarity, they felt energised, 
bridging parochial nationalism and cosmopolitan internationalism. The United 
Kingdom’s ‘Leave’ campaign needs to be understood as a part of a much 
longer history of right-wing international networks and shared aspirations. 
The phenomenon is hardly new. Transnational bonds between right-wing 
nationalist movements are as old as these movements themselves. United in 
a global struggle against their liberal and socialist enemies, nationalists 
throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries operated not only in 
national but also in transnational and international spaces. Historically, as we 
have been reminded by scholars like Patricia Clavin, Jessica Reinisch and 
Glenda Sluga, nationalism and internationalism have always been closely 
intertwined. Crossing national boundaries, nationalists have often also been 
remarkably cosmopolitan. Although scholars have shown great interest in the 
study of cosmopolitanism, both as an idea and as a practice performed by 
humans across the world, with diverse forms contingent on historical 
circumstances, they have predominantly assumed it to be the opposite of 
nationalism. Yet particularist nationalism and universalist cosmopolitanism are 
not necessarily incompatible. In theoretical terms cosmopolitanism is only 
possible (thinkable), dialectically, if there is a conception of the own (and 
multiple others), individual or (and) collective. Cosmopolitanism may well 
accommodate national differences. As a consequence a cosmopolitanism 
which implicitly recognises national differences can also be embraced by 
nationalists. Whether they have done so in practice has depended on 
historical circumstances. Usually the cosmopolitanism of right-wing 
nationalists, which we may call ‘reactionary cosmopolitanism’, has served as 
a means to pursue their concrete political agendas. 
To understand modern right-wing nationalist internationalism in its 
various forms – including as articulated as part of the campaign for the United 
Kingdom to leave the European Union – we need to understand the close 
historical connections between nationalism and internationalism. Indeed they 
are siblings, born in the nineteenth century. A response to the reactionary 
anti-revolutionary politics of the Concert of Europe, which itself was an 
internationalist alliance, both socialists and liberal nationalists formed 
internationals to rally their respective forces against the conservative 
restoration. Many nineteenth-century nationalists were cosmopolitans, 
considering the national order to be universal, and organised their struggle 
across borders. One of the most famous was the revolutionary Giuseppe 
Mazzini, who fought not only for Italian national unification but also for other 
national causes across Europe. Promoting an international association of 
nations, his People’s International League advocated ‘the Rights of 
Nationality’ and a ‘cordial understanding between the Peoples of all countries’. 
Mazzini’s comrade Giuseppe Garibaldi not only fought for the Italian 
Risorgimento but also supported the Geneva-based International League of 
Peace and Liberty, with its internationalist journal États-Unis d’Europe. Even as 
nationalists radicalised from the late nineteenth century, becoming 
increasingly anti-liberal, chauvinistic and authoritarian in the process, their 
internationalism often remained strong. 
The global wave of socialist upheavals following the October Revolution 
gave momentum to a powerful reactionary counter movement. In the anti-
communist moment of 1917–21, nationalists, ranging from moderate 
conservatives to far-right militants, united against the perceived communist 
threat. Many of them fought within their countries’ borders but most perceived 
their fight as part of an international struggle. One of the advocates of this 
right-wing international, Nicholas Murray Butler, president of Columbia 
University, differentiated in a 1917 tract between ‘colloidal’ and ‘crystalline’ 
internationalism. While ‘colloidal internationalism’ was, for him, the ‘hopelessly 
impractical’, ‘unsound’ and ‘unstable’ internationalism of liberals and the left, 
seeking ‘a world-wide community without national ties or national ambitions’, 
‘crystalline internationalism’ was a noble internationalism based on 
‘nationalistic and patriotic sentiments and aims’, being ‘elements in a larger 
human undertaking of which each nation should be an independent and 
integral part’. (Butler, A World in Ferment: Interpretations of the War for a New 
World, 1917, 7–8) Statements such as these show how contemporaries 
themselves made the distinction between traditional liberal (and socialist) and 
nationalist internationalism. To be sure, the interwar right-wing international 
was not only anti-Bolshevik, it was also ardently anti-liberal. One of its early 
arenas was the Geneva International, the Entente Internationale contre la IIIe 
Internationale, founded in 1924 by the Swiss right-wing intellectual Theodore 
Aubert and the Russian Red Cross functionary Georges Lodygensky. 
Committed to ‘defending the principles of order, family, property and 
nationality’ in ‘all countries’, it organised international gatherings, coordinated 
the activities of its members and produced propaganda periodicals, books and 
films. It brought together right-wing nationalist, anti-communist movements 
from no fewer than eighteen countries, with members from Europe, America, 
Australia, New Zealand, North Africa and Latin America. Its cosmopolitan 
networks included Francisco Franco in Spain, Philippe Pétain in France and 
Franz von Papen in Germany. The leaders of the Geneva International also 
embraced Mussolini and Hitler and cooperated with the Italian Centro di Studi 
Internazionali sul Fascismo and the Nazi Anti-Komintern. 
The 1920s and 1930s saw the rise to power of authoritarian nationalist 
and fascist movements across the world: Mussolini in Italy (1922), Salazar in 
Portugal (1928), Hitler in Germany (1933), Franco in Spain (1936), Vargas in 
Brazil (1937) and Phibulsonggram in Siam (1938). Creating new transnational 
spaces to organise their struggle against socialism and liberalism, from the 
outset the new regimes engaged in international cooperation and acted as 
patrons of right-wing movements in countries that had not yet been taken 
over, a phenomenon pointed to by historians like Michael Leeden (when still a 
serious scholar), Arnd Bauernkämper and Madeleine Herren. ‘Fascism is now 
an international movement, which means not only that the Fascist nations can 
combine for purposes of loot, but that they are groping, perhaps only half-
consciously as yet, towards a world system’, remarked George Orwell in 1937 
(Orwell, The Road to Wigan Pier). 
The fascist international gathered frequently at conferences. The most 
notable was the 1934 Conference of Fascist Parties in Montreux, organised 
by Mussolini’s Comitati d’Azione per l’Universalità di Roma, which was to forge a 
transnational alliance to combat socialism and liberal democracy. All major 
fascist regimes organised a wide range of international meetings and 
internationalised their own national political congregations. At their 1938 
Nuremberg Party Rally the Nazis welcomed fascist youth groups not only from 
Spain, Italy and Romania but also from Japan, Siam, Bolivia and Iraq. The 
regimes also established internationalist organisations that were meant to 
connect fascist movements across the world, including the Fasci Italiani 
all’Estero or the Nazi Party’s Auslandsorganisation. Most importantly, fascist 
movements actively supported each other politically, financially and militarily. 
Mussolini funded the British Union of Fascists, which Oswald Mosley had 
founded after a visit to Rome in 1932, the Heimwehr and Léon Degrelle’s 
Belgian Rexists; he also kept close ties with Corneliu Codreanu’s Iron Guard, 
Ference Szálasi’s Arrow Cross and Ante Pavelić’s Ustaša. Similarly, Hitler 
gave financial support to fascist groups abroad. Fascist internationalist 
collaboration was nowhere more visible than in the Spanish Civil War. As 
socialists from across the world flocked to Spain to swell the ranks of the 
International Brigades, fascist and right-wing nationalist militants, albeit fewer 
in number, fought alongside the nationalists, from Irish fascists to Romanian 
Iron Guard die-hards; this is not to mention the support Franco received from 
the regimes in Berlin, Rome and Lisbon. 
Besides these cooperations, the new authoritarian regimes also worked 
within existing international organisations. Although full of contempt for the 
League of Nations, they remained active members of many other international 
institutions. The Reichsbank, for example, remained a member of the Bank for 
International Settlements. Fascist regimes increasingly dominated the 
International Prison Commission; in 1935, its international congress convened 
in Berlin, attended by Goebbels. The Nazis worked with the International 
Olympic Committee, turning the 1936 Summer Olympics into an international 
celebration of the ‘new man’. In 1938 Germany took over the International 
Criminal Police Commission – Interpol’s predecessor – based in Vienna, and 
two years later Hitler’s hangman Reinhard Heydrich became its new 
president. 
This right-wing internationalism peaked during the Second World War. 
The Anti-Comintern Pact, signed by Tokyo and Berlin in 1936 (and in 1937 by 
Italy and Spain), was revised in 1941 to include, among others, Finland, 
Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, El Salvador and, as observer, Turkey. 
Forging an Axis internationalism, the Tripartite Pact, signed by Germany, Italy 
and Japan in 1940, was not only a military alliance, it also led to cooperation 
in research, culture and sports. Berlin even published a glossy bilingual 
journal, Berlin-Rom-Tokyo, to celebrate this internationalism, featuring articles 
ranging from the Germans in Hsinking to Japanese art exhibitions in 
Germany. As the tide of war turned against the Axis and Berlin began 
promoting the conflict even more vigorously as an international struggle 
against world Bolshevism, they recruited volunteers from across the continent 
(and beyond) into their armies. Even anti-colonial leaders joined this 
international, whether as part of Japan’s pan-Asian alliance, centred on the 
project for the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, or in Berlin’s anti-
colonial international, which brought together anti-colonial nationalists from 
the Middle East, South Asia and North Africa. To be sure, many of these 
international cooperations were the result of significant pragmatism, but there 
was a global consensus that fascism was indeed an international project. 
In the post-Second World War world, the far right, although crippled as a 
political force, continued to organise itself internationally. Examples range 
from the extremist World Union of National Socialists launched in 1962, which 
opened sections across the Americas, Europe and Asia, to the World Anti-
Communist League, created in 1966, which brought together the extreme 
right with more moderate conservatives. Prominent international meetings 
included a camp organised in 1961 by the British National Party, with 
delegations from the United States, Austria, France, Germany and Sweden, 
and the World Nationalist Congress, convened by American neo-fascists in 
the mid-1970s, with guests from the United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium and 
other countries, issuing declarations in support of South Africa and Rhodesia, 
requests for the release of Nazi war criminals and announcements of 
solidarity with ‘all White Nationalists throughout the world’. 
Moreover, at the national congresses of right-wing organisations, such as 
the Order of Flemish Militants, the French and European Nationalist Party 
(and also the Front National), the Golden Dawn and Germany’s National 
Democratic Party, foreign delegations were regular participants. Indeed, the 
post-war far right never made a secret of its internationalist ambitions. In the 
early 1960s the British National Party officially declared that it was ‘as much 
concerned with the fate of our people in Melbourne as those in Manchester, or 
those in Stockholm and those in Sheffield’, and that the ‘co-operation and 
comradeship’ with allies across borders was to forge a united nationalist 
‘world movement’. To be sure, such cooperations were not free of frictions 
and involved clashes between different far-right groups over questions 
concerning the relations between their countries. Their members did not 
always support their movements’ internationalist politics. But overall, the 
‘transnational right’, to use the words of Martin Durham and Margaret Power, 
was an integral part of the twentieth-century global political landscape. 
The most recent global nationalist resurgence is no different. Le Pen’s 
Front National, Orban’s Fidesz, Kaczyński’ Law and Justice Party, Erdogan’s 
Justice and Development Party, Salvini’s Lega Nord, Strache’s Freedom 
Party of Austria and Modi’s Indian People’s Party, as diverse as they might 
be, are united in their anti-liberal nationalism, hatred of ethnic, religious and 
sexual minorities, weakness for authoritarianism and scorn for multiculturalism 
and pluralism. All of these movements, even though less militant than many of 
their fascist and neo-fascist predecessors, try to connect the extremist far 
right with the conservative centre. Indeed, the boundaries between them and 
conservative parties are at times fuzzy. In the United States, far-right policies 
were adopted by Trump’s Republican Party, now advocating Muslim bans, 
immigrant internments and ultra nationalism. Theresa May’s Conservative 
Party aligned itself with much of the UK Independence Party’s political 
programme. 
Ironically, the cooperation between some of these groups can be 
observed in the European Parliament, most notably in the Europe of Nations 
and Freedom parliamentary group. In its official declaration the faction stated 
its aim as ‘the preservation of the identity of the peoples and nations of 
Europe, in accordance with the specific characteristics of each people’ and 
‘cooperation between nations’ rather than ‘a supra-state’. And their 
internationalism continues to crystallise at congresses, symposia and rallies. 
Salvini, who praised the ‘good work’ of Mussolini, attended a Trump election 
rally in Philadelphia in 2016. Le Pen, Wilders, Salvini and their allies 
frequently stage their solidarity at meetings. Following the British EU 
referendum and Trump’s victory, Le Pen, Wilders, Petry and others gathered 
in Koblenz, with Le Pen declaring, somewhat prematurely: ‘2016 was the year 
the Anglo-Saxon world woke up. 2017, I am sure, the people of continental 
Europe will wake up.’ Soon after, invited by Poland’s far-right government, 
Trump addressed cheering crowds at Warsaw’s Krasinski Square, calling for 
the defence of ‘Western civilisation’ against enemies, ‘whether they come 
from inside or out, from the South or the East’. A year later, Trump’s emissary 
in Berlin, Richard Grenell, pledged to ‘empower’ Europe’s right. Forming an 
international front against multiculturalism, all these political leaders have 
crossed borders to establish borders (sometimes literally). In 2018 Steve 
Bannon, former Trump whisperer, who cites Julius Evola as his intellectual 
inspiration, formed ‘The Movement’, headquartered in Brussels, to forge a 
European right-wing international; a group of reactionary cosmopolitans, its 
members have vowed to pave the way for a nationalist resurgence. The 
Brexiteers of Farage’s UK Independence Party have already signed up. 
Looking back over two centuries, right-wing nationalist internationalism 
has had many faces. Its actors have been diverse, ranging from local to 
national movements and states. Their agendas have changed over time, 
although the core enemies have remained liberalism, socialism and 
multiculturalism. Sceptical of supranational organisations, such as the League 
of Nations, the United Nations and the European Union, as subversive to 
‘national sovereignty’, they have promoted cooperation between autonomous 
nations. Their internationalism built on the assumption of the existence of 
supposedly homogenous, essentialised, closed national communities. It has 
been both a form of activism and a political idea. Enabled by modern 
communication technology, from the telegraph to the internet, as well as 
modern means of transport, right-wing nationalists have created their own 
transnational spaces of sociability and encounter. The interplay between 
nationalist and internationalist agendas has been complex. At times the 
nationalists’ parochial views, or ‘territorial instincts’, as Charles Maier put it, 
have made international cooperation difficult. Territorial loyalties have always 
remained crucial. But strikingly, right-wing cosmopolitanism has never been 
all-inclusive; it brings people together, across borders, to exclude others both 
inside and outside their own respective borders. From the outset, the UK’s 
‘Leave’ Campaign was very much embedded in this international and part of 
the as yet unwritten history of the globalisation of right-wing politics. 
 
